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Executive Summary 
 
Michael Moore is one of the most disputed authors and filmmakers in the United States. The 
purpose with this article is to try to shed some new insights and understandings of Moore’s 
political views as they are represented in his book “Dude, Where’s My Country?” and film 
“Fahrenheit 911”. By applying insights from international relations theory, we are trying to get a 
better understanding of Moore’s political views by putting his views within the framework of “soft 
power”. According to the soft power concept, the US’ mightiest power resource as of today is 
not its hard power (such as military and economic strength), but its soft power such as the 
attractiveness of its culture, political ideals, and policies. By applying the soft power concept, the 
article explains how Michael Moore is advocating a new foreign policy of the United States. This 
is a United States, which safeguards an international system made up by norms, institutions and 
a collective international order. Furthermore, the article underlines that Michael Moore’s 
popularity cannot be explained by rising anti-Americanism on a global scale, but quite the 
opposite. Instead, Michael Moore’s films and books could be regarded as a symptom of US soft 
power where he represents what people around the world regards as the attractiveness of the 
United States. 
 
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
 
Michael Moore is known to the public as an 
author, commentator and not least, a 
reward winning filmmaker who became 
known to the world audience with his two 
films “Bowling for Columbine” (2002) and 
“Fahrenheit 911” (2004). In ”Bowling for 
Columbine” he criticizes the American gun 
culture and the National Rifle Association 
(NRA). This film won the Anniversary Prize 
at the Cannes Film Festival and France’s 
Cesar Award for the best foreign film. In the 
United States, it won the Academy Award 
for Documentary Feature. In “Fahrenheit 
911” Moore examines the political life in the 
United States in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 
Furthermore, he seeks to uncover the family 
ties between the Bush family and the Bin 
Laden family. For the film, he was rewarded 
with the Palm d’Or, the top honour at the 
Cannes Film Festival. It was the first 
documentary to win such a prize since 
1956.  
Prior to these two films, his 
filmmaking includes “Roger & Me” (1989) 
which was his first film. “Roger and Me” was 
a critical commentary about what happened 
to his native town Flint, Michigan, after 
General Motors closed its factories and 
opened new ones in Mexico, where the 
workers were paid much less. “Canadian 
Bacon” (1995) is Michael Moore’s only 
fictional film, which featured a US president 
played by Alan Alda who started a fake war 
with Canada to boost his own popularity. In 
his film “The Big One” (1997) he criticizes 
the great multinational corporations for their 
hunger for even more profits and their 
propensities to mass layoffs despite record 
corporate profits. His latest film “Sicko” 
(2007) is a documentary where he 
investigates the American health care 
system where his focus is the American 
health insurance system and the great 
influence of the pharmaceutical industry. 
One of the main arguments in this film is 
that almost fifty million Americans are 
uninsured and that those who are covered 
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are often victims of insurance company 
fraud and red tape. 
His books have also sold in millions. 
In his book, “Downsize This!” (1996) he 
analyzed politics and corporate crime in the 
United States. In “Stupid White Men” (2001) 
he scrutinized US domestic and foreign 
policies and in “Dude, Where’s My 
Country?” (2003) he examined the Bush 
family’s relationships with the Saudi royalty, 
the Bin Laden family and the energy 
industry, as well as the US response to 
international terrorism. The book was 
furthermore a call-for-action for a 
Democratic victory at the 2004 US 
presidential election. Prior to the 2008 
Presidential election, he also issued an 
election guide where his main arguments 
were as follows: “After a disastrous war, the 
failure to catch bin Laden, millions of 
families who have lost their homes, the 
Katrina debacle, soaring gas prices feeding 
record oil company profits, and the largest 
national debt caused by the biggest 
spending and borrowing administration in 
American history, the country has had it with 
conservatives, right-wingers and 
Republicans”.11 
The purpose with this essay is two-
fold. Firstly, we will explain that in reality, 
what Michael Moore is aiming at via his 
books and films, is that the US should 
pursue what Joseph Nye Jr. has called a 
more soft power oriented foreign policy. 
According to Nye, the US’ mightiest power 
resource as of today is not its hard power 
(as military and economic strength), but its 
soft power such as the attractiveness of its 
culture, political ideals, and policies. 
Secondly, we will state that Michael Moore’s 
popularity and great influence on world 
opinion cannot be explained by rising anti-
Americanism on a global scale, but quite the 
                                                           
The authors would like to thank the editor and the 
two referees for their constructive comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. An earlier draft has also 
been presented at the “Third Art of Management 
Conference” in Krakow, Poland in September 2006.   
11 See http://www.michaelmoore.com/books-
films/index.php  
opposite. To illustrate that point we would 
like to quote from Joseph Nye’s book “Soft 
Power – The Means to Success in World 
Politics” (2004). Here he is referring to the 
Czech filmmaker Milos Forman who 
recounts that when the Communist 
government let in the American film “Twelve 
Angry Men” because of its harsh portrait of 
American institutions, Czech intellectuals 
responded by thinking, “If that country can 
make this kind of thing, films about itself, oh, 
that country must have a pride and must 
have an inner strength, and must be strong 
enough and must be free” (quoted in Nye 
2004: 17).   
This essay is organized as follows. The next 
chapter will give an overarching description 
of the American empire at the start of the 
21st century. Based upon novel political 
science research on the character of empire 
in the post-modern world, we will try to show 
that the United States is a different empire 
as compared with other empires in world 
history. Nevertheless, we will also try to 
illustrate how the new trends in American 
foreign policy have changed other countries’ 
perception of the United States. The central 
question then seems to be how different the 
United States is from other empires in world 
history. We will then turn our attention to the 
works of Michael Moore, but most focus will 
be put on his film “Fahrenheit 911” and his 
book “Dude, Where’s My Country?”. Both of 
them were produced and written after the 
terrorist attacks and therefore cover what 
this essay is seeking to explain, namely 
Moore’s view upon what role the US should 
play in the world. After that, we will compare 
the views of Michael Moore with the views 
presented in Joseph Nye’s book on 
American soft power. In the last part of the 
essay, we will seek additional explanations. 
By building upon insights from social 
constructivist theory, we can also state that 
Michael Moore’s film, “Fahrenheit 911” and 
book “Dude, Where’s My Country?”, raise 
some interesting arguments about how the 
representation of something as a threat to 
the United States can be used to justify 
measures that would otherwise not be seen 
as legitimate. 
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The character of the American empire 
 
The United States – A Different Empire? 
 
Ever since the United States became a 
great power and later on a superpower in 
the second half of the twentieth century, it 
has mostly pursued a foreign policy 
orientation based upon multilateralism. A 
multilateral oriented foreign policy is 
characterized by emphasis on international 
institutions and on a high degree of 
international legitimacy for the realization of 
its interests. It could even more be stated 
that it was the United States that took the 
necessary initiatives to establish several of 
the multilateral institutions as we know them 
today (the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank, 
etc.).  
G. John Ikenberry has described a 
system based upon a grand bargain 
between the United States and several of its 
closest allies (Ikenberry 2001). He explains 
that on the one hand, the United States 
exported security and opened up its 
markets for foreign investors. On the other 
hand, these allies functioned as military and 
political supporters of the US leadership in 
the world. Additionally, the leading role of 
the United States in the international system 
was accepted by the other actors as long as 
the United States abided by international 
norms and pursued an institutionalized 
foreign policy. As the Norwegian historian 
Geir Lundestad has written on several 
occasions, the United States was an empire 
by invitation (Lundestad 2003). During the 
Cold War, but also in the 1990’s, the United 
States enjoyed a very high degree of 
legitimacy and was regarded by others as a 
“primus inter pares”. The allies of the United 
States felt that they had a high degree of 
influence upon the foreign policy of the 
country (Melby 2002: 13). In the sense that 
the United States was an empire, it was a 
benevolent empire with a liberal ideology.  
In the 1980s, the debate on whether 
or not hegemony or an empire in the 
international system is necessary, 
dominated the international political 
economy (IPE) discourse with the so-called 
hegemonic stability theory. This theory was 
presented by Charles Kindleberger who 
stated in his book “The World in Depression 
1929 – 1939” that there must be a hegemon 
for an international system of trade and 
finance to function smoothly (Kindleberger 
1986). This is because there is a collective 
action problem in international politics 
where the regulation and institutionalization 
of trade and finance is a public good, that is, 
it benefits the community. To solve the 
collective action problem, a hegemon takes 
the lead and is motivated to do so because 
of the benefit it gains; for example, the US 
dollar benefited greatly as the reserve 
currency under the Bretton Woods system.  
What seemed to be characteristic of 
the American empire was that it was a very 
different empire who behaved differently 
from other empires in world history. It was a 
liberal and benevolent hegemony, which 
pursued a multilateral oriented foreign 
policy. Additionally, the story of the United 
States is also a story of a country that 
pursues ideal norms in its foreign policy 
based upon an exceptional ideology. 
Central to this exceptional approach is that 
the political system of the United States 
represents something very special and that 
the United States for this reason has a 
special responsibility in world politics. It is 
within such a context we must understand 
President George H. W. Bush’s statement 
at his so-called State of the Union address 
in 1991. Here he underlined that “We are a 
nation of rock-solid realism and clear-eyed 
idealism”. This statement also shows one of 
the most central tensions in American 
foreign policy, that between realism and 
idealism. While realism in accordance with 
the realist school in international relations 
(IR) theory deals with questions connected 
to power relationships, balance of power 
issues and the impact of the international 
anarchy upon the different states, idealism 
deals with questions connected to how the 
United States can contribute to make the 
world a better place to be. Hence, as John 
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Adams, the second president of the United 
States emphasized: “The United States will 
last forever, govern the globe and introduce 
the perfection of man” (quoted in Melby 
1995: 21). Therefore, President George W. 
Bush’s statement from 2005 that “America’s 
vital interests and our deepest beliefs are 
now one” is standing in a rather long 
tradition that illustrates the exceptional 
ideology that underpins the US state 
construct.12 
Therefore, the United States’ sense 
of itself is that it is quite different from other 
countries in world politics. As the former US 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk underlined, 
“While other countries have different 
interests, the United States have 
responsibilities” (ibid.). Hence, and 
according to the exceptional ideology, the 
United States has superior ideal motives for 
its actions, and therefore must impose upon 
itself another idealistic standard in the 
conduct of its foreign- and security policy. 
Therefore, Americans have tended to reject 
the idea that their high-minded republic 
might be imperial (much less imperialist). 
Empire has traditionally been identified with 
conscious military expansion. Washington 
may have organized an alliance, but it did 
not seek to conquer territory nor, 
supposedly, to dominate other societies 
(Maier 2002). The United States has 
therefore been what Michael Cox has called 
an empire by denial (Cox 2004; Cox 2005). 
Therefore, Americans don’t do empire; they 
do “leadership” instead, or as underlined by 
the conservative British historian Niall 
Ferguson, they do “hegemony” (Ferguson 
2003).   
By underlining these aspects, we 
also reach a deeper understanding of the 
character of the American form of empire. It 
therefore seems relevant to argue that the 
American empire traditionally has worked in 
a Gramscian way. The American empire 
                                                           
12 See John F. Harris (2005): “An Ambitious 
President Advances His Idealism”, Washington Post, 
21 Januar 2005. See 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A24961-2005Jan20.html  
has in many corners of the world, and the 
case is especially evident in Europe, worked 
through consensual domination and 
invisible power relations. The empire we are 
analyzing here is an empire, which has 
formed political, military, cultural and 
economical discourses. This we can see by 
tracing how the formation of meaning has 
been organized over time, how meaning 
has frozen in certain formations and ways of 
understanding “reality” (representations), 
and why exactly in these formations and not 
in others (Neumann 2001 quoted in Græger 
2005: 86).  
While other empire’s influence has 
stopped at its borders, the American empire 
has turned global through its attractiveness 
of its culture, way of life, or at least the way 
of life represented in media through its film 
industry but also through its economical as 
well as military strength. We must therefore 
understand the character of the American 
empire as of today, by seeing it through the 
prisms of globalization. The globalization 
process is driven forward in large part due 
to technological innovations and neo-liberal 
ideology. However, this form of empire has 
also been institutionalized, for example via 
NATO and other institutions where the 
United States has been and still is 
dominant. 
Therefore, it is important to 
underline, as Niall Ferguson so cleverly 
underlines, that empire has never 
exclusively meant direct rule over foreign 
territories (Ferguson 2003). Instead, it is 
important to distinguish between “direct” 
and “indirect” rule. In such a sense the 
United States could be regarded as an 
empire – albeit one that has, until recently, 
generally preferred indirect and informal 
rule. Whether its recent invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq presage a transition to 
more direct and formal imperial structures 
remains to be seen (ibid.). As a 
conservative British historian Niall Ferguson 
is of the opinion that the US has been a 
reluctant empire and that the demise of the 
US Empire (and indeed the Iraq response 
may exemplify decline) is a net loss to the 
world. 
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Enter George W. Bush 
 
The terrorist attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001 had tremendous 
effects upon the American society. It seems 
even fair to argue that it seems to be very 
difficult to overestimate these effects upon 
American society as well as politics. With 
George W. Bush in the White House, we will 
argue that during recent years and 
especially in connection with the Iraq war in 
2003, the United States developed a foreign 
policy characterized by idealistic inspired 
exceptionalism. We will argue that idealistic 
inspired exceptionalism is a central part of 
the neo-conservative ideology, which has 
inspired large parts of the Bush 
administration. We are, however, also 
aware of the fact that the neo-conservative 
approach has contributed to “a renewed 
relevance of classical Realists such as 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. 
Niebuhr’s and Morgenthau’s approach not 
only addressed themes at the heart of 
contemporary neo-conservatism, but who 
also provided prescient warnings of the 
dangerous directions in which neo-
conservative understandings of the national 
interest could lead” (Williams 2005: 307). 
Central to such a neo-conservative ideology 
is the use of force, including military force, 
conducted if necessary in a pre-emptive and 
unilateral manner, to replace authoritarian 
regimes with democratic ones. The Iraq war 
in spring 2003 was in our view the peak 
point in the neo-conservative influence upon 
American foreign policy.  
Because of neo-conservative 
influence, the multilateral track in the United 
States foreign policy has, additionally, been 
left and replaced with a unilateral one. The 
last issue is firstly due to the character of 
the international system that still is unipolar 
nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold 
War. Secondly, the United States has 
largely militarized its foreign policy, which 
has alienated its closest friends and allies, 
especially in Europe, but also in other parts 
of the world. Several European 
governments have therefore stated that the 
United States has broken with the most 
central norm in transatlantic relations since 
the creation of NATO in 1949, namely 
mutual adaptations to each other’s security 
needs within a multilateral framework 
(Sæter 2005: 45). The most critical voices in 
Europe have come from the governments in 
France and Germany as well as from 
several other middle sized and small 
European powers. Hence, the transatlantic 
relationship has weakened considerably. In 
the research discourse on the transatlantic 
relationship it is even debated whether the 
security community in the North Atlantic 
Area still exists (see e.g. Knutsen 2007).  
 This “Bush revolution” in American 
foreign policy is based upon the premise 
that the unipolar system will last and that 
the American empire is sustainable (Melby 
2002: 17-20). Hence, the Washington 
foreign policy elite tends to see itself as 
“masters of a universe in which the United 
States has a very special part to play by 
virtue of its unique history, its huge 
capabilities and its accumulated experience 
of running the world for the last 50 years” 
(Cox 2005: 26).  
In the IR debate on American foreign 
policy, on questions related to unipolarity 
and empire, it has during recent years been 
a debate on why the American empire has 
not been counter-balanced by other powers. 
Some of the answers to this question have 
been that the American empire is a different 
one and therefore has a higher legitimacy. 
Others have argued that it is only a matter 
of time before other powers will rise. Most 
researchers and political analysts argue that 
China might become a global peer 
competitor to the United States. Charles A. 
Kupchan does not buy this argument. 
According to him, it is not China but the 
emerging and integrating Europe that might 
become a competitor to the United States 
on the global arena (Kupchan 2002). He is 
therefore in line with the political realist 
Christopher Layne who in a much-cited 
article in “International Security” has written 
on the unipolar illusion and why other 
powers will rise (Layne 1993).   
  Vol 7 Issue  7.4 March 2009  ISSN 1532-5555 
112 
 In the IR debate we have also 
witnessed a turn in the debate towards 
arguments on whether the United States in 
reality is behaving differently from other 
empires in world history. The turning point in 
the debate was of course the terrorist 
attacks on September 11. These terrorist 
attacks implied that the United States 
declared a war on terrorism and hence went 
to war two times within a time-span of two 
years (Afghanistan and Iraq). Additionally, in 
the aftermaths of the terrorist attacks and in 
connection with the Bush administration’s 
war on terror, we have also witnessed a 
huge expansion of United States’ interests 
to places not previously known to be 
traditional spheres of American interests. 
These spheres are first of all Caucasus and 
Central-Asia including countries like 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Hence, the 
United States seems to behave as other 
empires have done. However, as the British 
historian Arnold Toynbee once pointed out, 
there are two problems that empires seem 
to meet: the threat of decay from within and 
the present danger of overextension abroad 
(Cox 2004: 586). 
 Toynbee’s point seems to be 
relevant as of today when we relate it to the 
American presence in Iraq. More than 4 200 
American men and women have been killed 
so far. Approximately 31 000 have been 
wounded. According to the website 
Iraqbodycount.org, about 90 000 Iraqi 
civilians have been killed by the military 
intervention.13 Even more, the war was 
initiated on false and/or misinterpreted 
intelligence data and on neo-conservative 
desk-analysis. As it turned out, the links 
between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist 
attacks on New York and Washington were 
non-existent and, furthermore, not a single 
gram of weapons of mass destruction has 
been found. Instead, the United States finds 
itself in a quagmire, in an Iraq characterized 
by civil war and where it seems nearly 
                                                           
13 At the website www.iraqbodycount.org, between 
88 951 and 97 092 Iraqi civilians have, as of 16 
November 2008, been killed due to the military 
intervention so far.  
impossible to withdraw with honour. 
Additionally, Iraq is splitting up in three 
different parts based upon ethnic and 
religious cleavages. Paradoxically, the 
United States is not, despite being the most 
powerful military nation on earth, able to 
control the situation on the ground.  
Characteristic for American defence 
planning in recent year has been its 
emphasis on high-tech warfare, the so-
called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
and not on nation building, which would 
have demanded more boots on the ground. 
As the British General Sir Michael Rose 
articulated in an article in International 
Herald Tribune in August 2004: “Instead of 
using overwhelming military force as the 
principle weapon in this war, a longer term, 
more indirect strategy, employing all 
instruments of government – economic, 
political social and military – needs to be 
adopted. This will inevitably entail a new 
doctrine and a different balance of force. 
Above all, increased manpower will be 
needed in the future of nation-building” 
(Rose 2004). 
 As a consequence, and according to 
Charles Grant of the London-based Centre 
for European Reform (CER): rarely in 
history had one nation mobilized so much 
hard power in such a short space of time; 
and never had it lost so much soft power in 
the process (quoted in Cox 2005: 28). An 
American commentator also emphasized 
that never had the country gone into battle 
with so few allies actually prepared to back 
it enthusiastically: “In fact never had such a 
war, even before it began, generated so 
much global opposition, the overwhelming 
bulk of it caused less by any sympathy that 
people might have had towards America’s 
intended target than by what many regarded 
as the dangerously aggressive policies of 
an overpowered state led by a president 
with little concern for global opinion” (ibid.: 
27).  
 Such a concern corresponds 
perfectly with the arguments made by 
Joseph Nye in his criticism of the foreign 
policies of the Bush administration. In this 
connection, he is referring to a speech on 
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the concept of soft power he gave at a 
conference organised by the US Army in 
Washington DC. One of the other speakers 
was Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld. According to a press account, 
“The top military brass listened 
sympathetically” to Joseph Nye’s views, but 
when someone in the audience later asked 
Rumsfeld for his opinion on soft power, he 
replied, “I don’t know what it means” (Nye 
2004: ix).  
 
Michael Moore’s perspectives on the 
United States’ role in the world 
 
It is not an exaggeration to argue that 
Michael Moore’s book “Dude, Where’s My 
Country?” and film “Fahrenheit 911” 
represents a frontal attack on George W. 
Bush and his presidency. In an academic 
term, it is an attack on the Bush-
administration’s securitization of the threat 
from terrorism and how the United States is 
applying the terror threat as a strategy to 
dominate the world in an imperial manner.14 
What the Bush administration has done, 
according to Moore, is to create a discourse 
at home as well as abroad in which 
terrorism is presented as an existential 
threat to the American and international 
society. By applying some key concepts 
from social constructivist approaches to IR, 
we could argue that this attempt to 
securitize terrorism has initiated a process 
of securitizing moves (Buzan & Wæver 
2003: 70-76). In this connection, terrorism is 
only securitized, when this move is 
accepted or forced to be accepted, by the 
American and the broader international 
society as well. It is not an overstatement to 
argue that this attempt to create such a 
securitizing move has succeeded. The US 
attempt to make a securitizing move to gain 
                                                           
14 The analytical term ”securitization” has dominated 
the IR discourse in recent years and is central to the 
so-called Copenhagen school of IR. See e.g. Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003): Regions and Powers – 
The Structure of International Security; Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations. Cambridge 
University Press. 
support for the Iraq war was, however, not 
that successful.  
With this theoretical approach in 
mind, we can reach a deeper understanding 
of the seven questions he asks George W. 
Bush (or George of Arabia as Moore is 
calling him) in the beginning of the book 
(Moore 2003: 1-40). Several of the same 
questions are also posed in the film. By 
posing questions connected to the business 
affiliations between the bin Laden family 
and the Bush family, by questioning the so-
called “special relationship” between the 
Bushes and the Saudi royalty, on why a 
Saudi jet was allowed to fly around in the 
US to pick up family members of Osama bin 
Laden in the days right after the terrorist 
attacks, why representatives from Taliban 
travelled around in Texas before the 
terrorist attacks to meet George W. Bush’s 
oil and gas company friends etc., Moore is 
attempting to create an enemy image of the 
US president. More than that, he is in fact 
trying to make the presidency of George W. 
Bush “The Other”. By “othering” the Bushes, 
Moore was (unsuccessfully) trying to create 
a like-minded front of liberals to replace 
Bush with John Kerry in the 2004 
presidential election.  
Moore’s way of making his 
arguments is therefore an example of the 
ever-increasing polarization of US politics 
(see e.g. Nivola 2005). On the one hand, it 
could therefore be argued that President 
George W. Bush is, through the 
securitization of terrorism, via the creation of 
different forms for securitizing moves (e.g. 
Afghanistan and Iraq), trying to lay the 
foundation for a lasting American empire. 
This time not an empire by denial, but an 
explicit American empire based upon the 
so-called Bush doctrine. This Bush doctrine 
could be labelled “the promotion of 
democracy through American leadership, if 
necessary, with the help of American 
military force”. On the other hand, Michael 
Moore, we would argue, could be regarded 
as the personified “Other” to the President. 
He considers himself a person who stands 
up to fight the President’s domestic as well 
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as international crusade.15 Even more than 
that, when the United States President 
states in an interview with MSNBC in 
February 2004 that: “I'm a war president.  I 
make decisions here in the Oval Office in 
foreign-policy matters with war on my 
mind”;16 Bush is, according to Moore, not 
only trying to create an American empire 
abroad, but he is also undermining 
American civil rights at home.  
By passing the so-called Patriot Act 
and by creating a Department for Homeland 
Security, the US is in practice, challenging, 
according to Moore, the so-called fourth 
amendment of the US Constitution. This 
amendment states that each human being 
has the right to privacy. With the Patriot Act 
(which is, according to Moore not patriotic at 
all), the fundamental human rights are 
challenged: “[T]hat once you allow your 
rulers to snoop into your life and violate your 
“space”, the notion of living in a free society 
is out the window” (ibid.: 107). According to 
the Patriot Act, the US government may 
now “trap and trace” all those countless e-
mails you thought were private. Moore 
states further that if this continues, you 
might as well delete the word “confidential” 
from your spellchecker: “Also up for 
inspection: banking records, school records, 
the list of library books you or your nine-
year old checked out this year (or even how 
often you have logged onto the Internet at 
the library), and your customer purchases. 
Think I’m exaggerating? Next time you are 
sitting in your doctor’s waiting room or 
waiting in line at the bank, read their new 
privacy statements. Buried in the legalese 
you will find new warnings that your privacy 
                                                           
15 The concept “crusade” was applied by the US 
President in the days right after the terrorist attacks as 
a label on the US fight against terrorism. See e.g. 
Peter Fords article in Christian Science Monitor: 
“Europe cringes at Bush ‘crusade’ against terrorists”, 
19 September 2001. The article could be found on: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p12s2-
woeu.html  
16 This statement was made by the US president in an 
interview with Tim Russert at MSNBC on 8 February 
2004. The transcript of the interview can be found on 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4179618/   
protections do not cover the Big Brother 
provisions of our new Patriot Act” (ibid.: 
106).  
What these efforts by the Bush 
administration have done, is to make it look 
like the US is at war abroad as well as 
domestically. The Patriot Act, the creation of 
the Department for Homeland Security, the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq must therefore 
be seen in connection with each other since 
their origin is the same: The fear of future 
terrorist attacks and the different 
securitization moves which have been put 
forward so as to secure the national security 
of the United States. According to the neo-
conservative approach, the best way to 
secure the US from a future terrorist attack, 
is that the US should pursue a foreign- and 
security policy, which upholds the unipolar 
international system. Therefore, Michael 
Moore attempts not only to attack the Bush-
administration, but also the neo-
conservative ideology, which has formed 
American foreign policy since 2001 when 
George W. Bush illegally, according to 
Moore, became president.17  
Central to the neo-conservative 
ideology is e.g. the think tanks like the 
Project of the New American Century 
(PNAC) which states that: “American 
leadership is good both for America and for 
the world; and that such leadership requires 
military strength, diplomatic energy and 
commitment to moral principle .... [PNAC] 
intends (...) to explain what American world 
                                                           
17 There has been some debate within the IR 
community on the influence by the neo-conservatives 
upon US foreign- and security policy. In an article in 
“International Politics” Steven Hurst of the 
Manchester Metropolitan University argues that neo-
conservatism has had very little impact upon the 
framing of the Bush administration’s foreign- and 
security policy (Hurst 2005). According to him, the 
Bush administration’s foreign policy is framed more 
along the lines of nationalist impulses. We are, 
however, in this essay sticking to the widely held 
opinion that the neo-conservative impulse has been 
quite large. This impulse has, in our view, decreased 
significantly during recent years due to the 
tremendous difficulties the US and other members of 
the “Coalition of the willing” are facing in Iraq.  
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leadership entails. It will also strive to rally 
support for a vigorous and principled policy 
of American international involvement and 
to stimulate useful public debate on foreign 
and defence policy and America's role in the 
world”. Within PNAC we will find influential 
personalities, who have contributed 
significantly to the turn in American foreign 
policy in recent years (the so-called “Bush-
revolution”) as well as persons who have 
shaped the IR debate on e.g. transatlantic 
relations. Here we will find personalities like 
Lawrence F. Kaplan, William Kristol, Robert 
Kagan and Paul Wolfowitz who until 
recently was the head of the World Bank. 
Robert Kagan became influential in the IR 
debate when he argued that Europe was 
from Venus and the United States from 
Mars, and hence, Europe was weak and the 
United States strong (Kagan 2002).  
 What the Bush administration is 
aiming at, according to Moore, is a “feverish 
desire to rule the world, first by controlling 
us, and then, in turn, getting us to support 
their efforts to dominate the world” (Moore 
2003: 101). Therefore, September 11 was 
the Bush administration’s moment – a 
moment handed to them by fate, via the 
terrorists – to seize the “reins and ram the 
USA down the throats of any people in the 
world who dare question who is number 
one. Who is number one? I SAID, WHO IS 
NUMBER ONE? That’s right. Say it loud! 
Say it, for George and Dick and Johnny and 
Condi: WE ARE NUMBER ONE! USA! 
USA! USA!” (ibid.). As we can understand, 
irony and exaggerations are parts and 
parcel of Michael Moore’s method of 
communicating with his audience. 
 By applying fear via the 
securitization of terrorism, by creating a link 
between the September 11 attacks and 
Saddam’s Iraq and with the National 
Security Strategy decided upon in 
September 2002 as a foundation, Moore is 
telling us his story of how the Iraq war was 
started and how the administration created 
a “coalition of the willing” to oust Saddam 
from power. Furthermore, the National 
Security Strategy defined the concept of 
pre-emptive attacks, or preventive war as 
critics would have said, which entails a 
premise that deterrence against terrorist 
actors will not work, and that the United 
States must strike pre-emptively (or 
preventively) before the terrorists attack the 
United States.18 In this connection, Moore 
emphasizes that: “George W. Bush laid the 
groundwork for scaring us silly early on. In 
his speech to the United Nations in 
September 2002, Bush said with a straight 
face that “Saddam Hussein has defied all 
these efforts and continues to develop 
weapons of mass destruction. The first time 
we may be completely certain he has a 
nuclear weapons [sic]is when, God forbids, 
he uses one” (ibid. : 43). Soon after, on 
October 7, Bush, according to Moore, told 
an audience in Cincinnati: “If the Iraqi 
regime is able to produce, buy or steal an 
amount of highly enriched uranium a little 
larger than a single softball, it could have a 
nuclear weapon in less than a year.... 
Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot 
wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – 
that could come in the form of a mushroom 
cloud” (ibid.).  
 As we all know today, these 
statements made by the US President and 
all other Heads of State and Governments 
who supported the Iraq war (the Coalition of 
the willing), were false. Up to present day, 
no weapon of mass destruction has been 
found. The so-called links between al-Qaida 
and the Saddam Hussein regime were 
spurious at best. In fact, Osama bin Laden 
considered Saddam Hussein to be an 
infidel. Hussein committed the sin of 
creating a secular Iraq instead of a Muslim 
state run by Muslim clerics.  
Additionally, Michael Moore is 
referring to a US poll which found that half 
of those questioned, incorrectly, thought 
that one or more of the September 11 
hijackers held Iraqi citizenship: “The Bush 
administration had succeeded in 
perpetrating one of the biggest lies of all 
time, confusing Saddam with Osama in the 
                                                           
18 The National Security Strategy of the United States 
can be found on 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html   
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minds of the American public” (ibid.). The 
Bush administration was therefore 
successful when they managed to convince 
the American public about the links between 
the September 11 attacks and Iraq. The 
truth is that 15 out of the 19 hijackers held 
Saudi citizenship. This fact makes Michael 
Moore speculate whether the hijackers were 
Saudi military pilots, and not aviation 
amateurs (ibid.: 15-19). Furthermore, he is 
also questioning Osama bin Laden’s health 
situation when he is referring to his kidney 
problems and therefore questions this 
man’s ability to plan the most horrendous 
terrorist attacks in world history (ibid.). 
As a consequence - and history has 
on this point proved Michael Moore correct - 
the Iraqi regime did not pose any global 
threat. It did not pose any regional threat 
either. It did pose, however, a threat to its 
own population as we can see from its 
history of using poison gas against its 
Kurdish population. Iraq also applied poison 
gas in the war against Iran, which lasted 
from 1980 until 1988. However, in this 
connection, Moore makes no secret out of 
the fact that in the 1980’s, Iraq under 
Saddam Hussein, was a close ally with the 
United States. It was during this time that 
Iraq fought a bloody war with the US’ 
archenemy Iran, in which the US provided 
the Iraqi regime with information on Iranian 
troop movements etc. In fact, during the 
1980’s the US government and US 
companies supplied the Iraqi regime with 
several “dual use”19 technologies, including 
high-powered computers, lasers, and other 
items instrumental to the making of nuclear 
weapons and their components (ibid.: 50). 
Therefore, Moore is stating, the US 
has a long tradition of supporting 
dictatorships. In fact, he underlines, the US 
likes dictators (ibid.: 58). The list of 
dictatorships the US has supported during 
history is therefore quite long. These days, 
China, “the world’s biggest Saddam-o-rama, 
is our favourite dictatorship” (ibid.: 59). In 
China, the government imposes severe 
                                                           
19 Dual use technologies refer to technologies, which 
can have civilian as well as more military purposes.   
limits on media outlets, the Internet, 
worker’s rights, religious freedom, and any 
attempts to independent thinking. According 
to Moore, these elements “combined with a 
judicial system that totally ignores any rule 
of law and is festering with corruption, China 
is a perfect place for American companies 
to do business” (ibid.). 
Therefore, the prescription Moore is 
proposing to prevent future terrorist attacks 
is quite different from those proposed and 
implemented by the present US 
administration. In his ironic and 
exaggerating approach, he is, in chapter 5 
of the book, telling us how the US should 
pursue a policy which in the IR debate could 
be labelled liberal as well as multilateral. It 
is liberal in the sense that it is possible to 
transcend “power politics” and govern 
relations between peoples and states on the 
basis of legal norms, moral principles and 
according to what is “right” and “just” 
(Steans & Pettiford 2005: 30). It is 
furthermore multilateral in the sense that it 
assumes that international institutions and 
regimes might change state behaviour 
through learning and that states behave 
differently in information-rich environments 
as compared with information-poor 
environments (Keohane 1984). 
Careful reading of Michael Moore’s 
suggestions implies that he, in accordance 
with the liberal school in IR, takes a broad 
approach to security challenges and threats. 
He suggests that the level and scope of 
terrorism might be reduced by combating 
poverty and promoting the spread of 
democracy based upon multilateral 
cooperation. On the other hand, he is 
emphasising that such a strategy will not 
eradicate terrorism: “There will be future 
terrorist attacks... Bush’s program for 
homeland security is providing us with no 
security at all” (Moore 2003: 119). On the 
other hand, he is arguing that the “only true 
security comes from ensuring that all 
people, here and around the globe, are able 
to meet their basic needs and dream of a 
better life. At the very last, we have to make 
damn sure we are not the ones robbing 
them of that dream” (ibid.: 128). 
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His suggestions when it comes to 
security and defence issues are that the US 
security strategy should be revised with the 
abolition of the strategy of pre-emptive 
strikes. Furthermore, Michael Moore’s 
proposal for getting rid of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) is to start getting rid of 
them self. Hence, what he is proposing is 
unilateral disarmament (ibid.: 125). When 
conferring Moore’s view with the IR-debate 
on the future status of the non-proliferation 
treaty (NPT), very few people indeed, 
including security and defence experts, fully 
understand the real dynamics which 
underpin the NPT. In the treaty, the non-
nuclear signatories are obliged not to 
procure, possess, and produce nuclear 
weapons. The NPT treaty acknowledges, 
however, that there are five countries that 
are in possession of such weapons – China, 
France, Great Britain, Russia and the 
United States. The utility of the NPT is 
therefore conditioned upon a dual dynamics 
in which the non-nuclear countries renounce 
any nuclear programme, while the nuclear 
powers are obliged to pursue a policy of 
nuclear disarmament. It is this dual 
dynamics of nuclear abstention and 
disarmament which is the driving force 
behind the treaty. Hence, a policy by one or 
more of the nuclear powers to improve their 
own nuclear capabilities may therefore 
tempt some of the non-nuclear countries to 
start doing research and establish 
themselves as future nuclear powers. 
Furthermore, it is nearly commonly agreed 
in the IR community that a proliferation of 
nuclear weapons may imply increased 
international instability.20 Therefore, 
according to Moore, global nuclear 
disarmament may enhance international 
                                                           
20 The agreement has, however, not been unanimous. 
Some neo-realists, like Kenneth N. Waltz and John 
Mearsheimer underlines that a controlled nuclear 
proliferation to countries like Germany and Ukraine, 
may enhance European and Euro-Atlantic security. 
See e.g. John Mearsheimer’s much disputed article 
“Back to the Future – Instability in Europe After the 
Cold War” which was published in the highly 
acclaimed IR-journal “International Security” (Vol. 
15, No. 1) in 1990.  
stability and reduce the scope of 
international terrorism.  
Michael Moore’s views as they are 
presented in his latest book and film 
(Fahrenheit 911) are therefore liberal, not 
only in a political sense, but in a IR 
perspective as well. Therefore, the next 
chapter will focus upon in which way the 
views presented by Moore can be 
represented within the context of soft-
power, a concept elaborated by one of the 
most influential IR scholars of our time – 
Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
 
Joseph Nye and the concept of soft 
power in American foreign policy 
 
The soft power concept, elaborated by 
Joseph Nye in several books and articles of 
his, has been one of the most discussed 
phenomena in the IR-literature in recent 
years. The soft power of a country rests 
primarily on three resources: its culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), its 
political values (when it lives up to them at 
home and abroad), and its foreign policies 
(when they are seen as legitimate and 
having moral authority). Therefore, soft 
power refers to the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payments. It arises from the 
attractiveness of a country’s culture, political 
ideals, and policies. When you can get 
others to admire your ideals and to want 
what you want, you do not have to spend as 
much on sticks and carrots to move them in 
your direction. Therefore, a country may 
obtain the outcomes it wants in world 
politics because other countries – admiring 
its values, emulating its example, aspiring to 
its level of prosperity and openness – want 
to follow it. The success of soft power 
heavily depends on the country’s reputation 
within the international community, as well 
as the flow of information between actors. 
Thus, soft power is often associated with 
the rise of globalization and liberal IR 
theory, even though it is much too simple to 
equate globalization with Americanization. 
Other cultures contribute mightily to global 
connections as well. Popular culture and 
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media is regularly identified as a source of 
soft power, as is the spread of a national 
language, or a particular set of normative 
structures; a nation with a large amount of 
soft power and the good will which inspires 
others to acculturate, avoiding the need for 
expensive hard power expenditures.  
Nevertheless, Nye also emphasises 
that attraction can turn into repulsion if the 
US acts in an arrogant manner and destroys 
the real message of the US’ deeper values. 
According to Nye, the four-week war in Iraq 
in the spring of 2003 was a dazzling display 
of America’s hard military power that 
removed a tyrant, but it did not resolve the 
US’ vulnerability to terrorism. It was also 
costly in terms of the US’ soft power – the 
ability to attract others and thereby 
sidelining with the US in the so-called 
“Coalition of the willing”. In the words of the 
Financial Times: “To win the peace, 
therefore, the US will have to show as much 
skill in exercising soft power as it has in 
using hard power to win the war” (quoted in 
Nye 2004: xi). Therefore, domestic or 
foreign policies that appear to be 
hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the 
opinion of others, or based upon a narrow 
approach to national interests can 
undermine soft power (ibid.: 14). 
 This is especially the case in times 
when the security threats become 
asymmetrical and originate from non-state 
actors. Nye agrees with the Bush 
administration’s focus upon threats from 
terrorism as well as from weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), but he disagrees with 
the Bush administration’s exaggerated 
focus upon the US ability to exercise hard 
power, and according to Nye, it is through 
soft power that terrorists gain general 
support as well as new recruits (ibid.: 24). 
 
Soft power and Michael Moore’s approach 
to American foreign policy 
 
Michael Moore’s views as they are 
represented in his latest book (“Dude, 
Where’s My Country?”) as well as film 
(“Fahrenheit 911”) suits well within the 
framework of a soft power approach to US 
foreign- and security policy. Therefore, what 
Moore clearly is advocating is a foreign- and 
security policy orientation which is more soft 
power-oriented. In his book and film, Moore 
clearly rejects the US Administration’s and 
the neo-conservative’s overarching aim of 
upholding the US-dominated unipolar 
international system. Moore disavows any 
form of American imperialism and the notion 
of an American empire. Even more than 
that, Moore’s views clearly correspond with 
the European approach to international 
politics, namely effective multilateralism.21 
He even states that France is one of the US’ 
closest allies: “They’ve brought us the 
Enlightenment, and The Enlightenment 
paved the way for the widespread 
acceptance of all the ideas and principles 
that America was founded on.... In fact, 
France has always been the best friend to 
the United States” (Moore 2004: 68-69). In 
this perspective, the then French minister of 
foreign affairs and also former Prime 
Minister, Dominique de Villepin, could be 
regarded as a spokesperson for a soft 
power approach to international relations. 
Moore is referring to him and his speech at 
the United Nations as the war in Iraq began:  
“Make no mistake about it: the 
choice is indeed between two 
visions of the world. Those who 
choose to use force and think they 
can resolve the world’s complexity 
through swift and preventive action, 
we offer in contrast determined 
                                                           
21 The concept ”effective multilateralism” was so to 
say “invented” by the European Union (EU) in its 
security strategy (ESS) from 2003 which is labeled 
“A Secure Europe in a Better World”.  The ESS 
states e.g. that: “In a world of global threats, global 
markets and global media, our security and prosperity 
increasingly depend on an effective multilateral 
system. The development of a stronger 
international society, well functioning international 
institutions and a rule-based international order 
is our objective.” This multilateral approach to the 
security risks, threats and challenges now facing us 
runs contrary to the US National Security Strategy 
with its emphasis on pre-emptive strikes and 
unilateralism in foreign affairs questions. 
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action over time. For today, to 
ensure our security, all the 
dimensions of the problem must be 
taken into account: both the manifold 
crisis and their many facets, 
including cultural and religious. 
Nothing lasting in international 
relations can be built therefore 
without dialogue and respect for the 
other, without exigency and abiding 
by principles, especially for the 
democracies that must set the 
example. To ignore this is to run the 
risk of misunderstanding, 
radicalization and spiralling violence. 
This is even more true in the Middle 
East, an area of fractures and 
ancient conflicts where stability must 
be a major objective for us” (quoted 
in Moore 2004: 64). 
 
Hence, a foreign policy orientation that is 
multilaterally oriented which ensures an 
international system based upon collective 
arrangements, is central to a soft power 
oriented foreign policy. Joseph Nye 
underlines that the US has been more 
successful in the domain of hard power, 
when the US has invested more, trained 
more, and has a clearer idea of what the US 
is doing. The US has been less successful 
in the area of soft power, where the US 
public diplomacy has been woefully 
inadequate and where the neglect of allies 
and institutions has created a sense of 
illegitimacy that has squandered the 
attractiveness of the United States (Nye 
2004: 147). The same goes for a policy 
based on a securitisation of all the 
challenges now facing the US where such a 
securitisation is leading towards a policy 
that justifies measures that would otherwise 
not be seen as legitimate.  
As an example, in his film 
“Fahrenheit 911” Moore interviews a group 
of elderly peace activists who have 
assembled to write newspaper articles and 
arrange meetings in which their aim is to 
protest against the war in Iraq. However, 
their existence did not go unnoticed by the 
Bush administration. After some time a new 
person joined this group. It later turned out 
that this was a FBI informant. By contrasting 
several of the statements made by this 
group with several statements made by the 
President, Moore manages to present 
President Bush as somewhat paranoid; 
seeing terrorists on “every corner”. In fact, 
the whole Bush administration is ridiculed in 
this way. Why is the FBI using resources on 
sending a clandestine informant to infiltrate 
this group of people whose only “felony” has 
been to discuss books on peace, writing 
letters to newspapers and talking to fellow 
citizens on the streets and at the local 
“speakers corner”? That portrayal is of 
course Moore’s intention. The statements 
made by the President are meant for a 
national or international audience, showing 
that the United States is responding strongly 
against any threat to the national security. 
When mixed into a very local – almost 
private – context, these statements by the 
President are easily conceived as being out 
of place, with little relevance to the groups 
activities. Furthermore, Moore is telling us in 
his way how the US authorities are applying 
measures which in more “normal times” 
would have been regarded as inappropriate.  
In this way Moore is also telling us his view 
on the Bush administration’s willingness to 
securitize domestic affairs. Hence, instead 
of regarding the fight against terrorism as a 
“war”, the US should, according to Moore, 
instead regard terrorism as a serious crime. 
By defining terrorism as a crime, the US 
citizens could have avoided the most 
serious consequences of the securitization 
moves made by the US government. It 
could also have avoided the serious 
tensions that have risen between the US 
and several of its traditional closest friends 
and allies (France included). In fact, there is 
a debate within the IR community now 
where it is argued that those who see the 
fight against terrorism as “war” regard the 
international system through the prisms of 
the Westphalian system, while those who 
regard terrorism as crime regard the 
international system through the prisms of 
an international society approach 
(Frederking, Artime & Pagano 2005). This 
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dispute perpetuates two dominant post-cold 
war trends: attempts by many in the 
international community to construct global 
collective security rules, and resistance to 
that project from a hegemonic United 
States. A United States which safeguards 
an international system made up by norms, 
institutions and a collective international 
order, corresponds with a soft power-
oriented USA. 
 
The critics of Michael Moore 
 
However, Michael Moore is one of the most 
disputed authors and filmmakers in the 
United States. A much held view among 
Moore’s critics is that he is a powerful anti-
government and anti-war protester, a 
domestic enemy, a liar and a cheat, who 
uses information and interviews selectively 
to pursue certain political goals as for 
instance make American politicians look 
useless, corrupt and stupid (Acher 2004). 
He is also by some regarded as an 
opportunist who has made millions of 
dollars by spreading conspiracy theories 
and attacking capitalism or that he is 
undermining the American effort to spread 
democracy and defeat terrorism, or even as 
Marxist propaganda (Koch 2004). However, 
as Michael Moore stated in an interview in 
Vanity Fair in 2004: “I must do something 
right, to get so much venom from the wrong 
people”.  
 Careful reading of Michael Moore’s 
book and similarly careful look at his film 
shows that he in no way could be regarded 
as an anti-American. On the contrary, he 
could also be regarded as an American 
patriot, an archetype of a “good old” 
American working-class hero and a man of 
the people. In other words, he is trying to 
behave as a down to earth ordinary Joe 
fighting corporate America, multinationals 
and Republicans. He furthermore claims 
that his aim is to educate and enlighten the 
American people about the Bush 
administration and its politics and 
multinational corporations. He applies 
humour by behaving as an easygoing 
person asking serious questions or 
comments to men in power. He often uses 
the “one lonely man against the rich and 
powerful” image. This has made him a world 
hero and the British newspaper The Mirror 
made him “The greatest living American” in 
2005.  
 His work can furthermore be 
regarded as a continuation of traditional 
leftwing critics in the political tradition of 
Noam Chomsky. However, Michael Moore 
is more; he is also an entertainer, a 
filmmaker and a journalist. He is down to 
earth and not an academic. He dropped out 
of college at the age of 22, and this can in 
some groups of the population make him 
even more trustworthy. Moreover, he has 
proved to be right in many cases, like the 
Iraq war. However, Moore’s movies, books 
and television programs are not clear on 
what he wants to accomplish. He does not 
articulate it, other than his goal to enlighten 
the American people, but the message is 
clear: The war must stop and President 
George W. Bush has to get out of office. 
Nevertheless, we cannot find a clear-cut 
alternative of what he really wants instead. 
He has been rather reluctant on that matter, 
other than his support for John F. Kerry 
during the presidential election campaign in 
2004 and of course Barrack Obama in 
2008. We have no reason not to believe his 
agenda, but there is a danger in making 
politics or politicians look like greedy or 
funny morons. It could of course lead to 
better politicians, who take his points 
seriously and change the course of 
American politics to soft power again, but it 
could also lead to a further decline in 
American voting participation and more 
distrust towards politics in general. 
 
The rise of anti-Americanism on the world 
stage 
 
The evidence is clear: There has been a 
markedly increase in anti-Americanism on 
the world stage since the “war” against 
terror was initiated in 2001. As underlined 
by Nye, this could have serious 
consequences. It is true that the United 
States has recovered from unpopular 
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policies in the past, but that was against the 
backdrop of the Cold War, in which other 
countries still feared the Soviet Union as the 
greatest evil (Nye 2004: 129). As an 
example, by July 2003, according to a 
Reuters poll, one-third of Germans under 
the age of 30 said that they thought the 
American government might even have 
staged the original September 11 attacks 
(ibid.: 130). Furthermore, the United States 
is also considered by many to be a greater 
danger to world peace and stability, than 
both Iran and North Korea’s nuclear 
programme.  
According to a research project 
conducted by Pew Research Center in 
Washington DC in the spring of 2006 
among 17 000 respondents from 15 
countries it is evident that anti-Americanism 
is still on the rise more than three years 
after the major hostilities in Iraq ended. As 
an example, the share of the respondents 
with a positive image of the United States 
has fallen from 71 % to 56 % in India, from 
43 % to 23 % in Spain and from 23 % to 12 
% in Turkey. The majority of the 
respondents are also of the opinion that the 
US war against terrorism has contributed to 
increased international instability. 60 % of 
the British respondents are of the opinion 
that the war in Iraq has made the world a 
more dangerous place. 30 % thinks the 
opposite - that the world has become a 
safer place.22 
 However, Michael Moore’s influence 
and popularity cannot be regarded as part 
of this rising anti-Americanism. On the 
contrary, Michael Moore’s popularity must 
be seen within the framework of American 
soft power. In our view, the key to 
understand Michael Moore’s influence on 
world opinion is to be found in such 
intangible power resources as the 
attractiveness of the American society to 
                                                           
22 The results from the Pew Research Center were 
published in the Norwegian daily Dagsavisen, 14 
June 2006. For a more thorough description of the 
investigation, see 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=2
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others, including its universalistic culture 
and its national cohesion. Hence, what 
Michael Moore is representing, is the image 
of the United States that other people 
around the world find attracting with the 
American society. American soft power is 
therefore still a factor to reckon with. 
Furthermore, Milos Foreman is correct 
when he stated that the US must have an 
“inner strength”, it must be “strong” and 
“free” when Hollywood could produce such 
films as “Twelve Angry Men” back in the 
1950’s (Nye 2004: 17). Therefore, the 
United States is the only country in Joseph 
Nye’s overview of countries and regions, 
which scores “strong” on all power 
resources, tangible and intangible power 
resources likewise (Nye 1990: 174). The 
tangible power resources are basic 
resources (e.g. natural resources as coal-, 
oil- and steel production), military strength, 
economic development and scientific and 
technological progress. Intangible power 
resources are national cohesion, 
universalistic culture and international 
institutions. This fact also illustrates that 
popular culture, including media and English 
as the world’s lingua franca, have created 
new and formative normative structures 
which frames peoples mindsets and creates 
new identities. These elements must 
therefore be taken into consideration when 
one assesses the influence of Michael 
Moore’s books and films.  
At the same time, we would also argue that 
the neo-realists are correct when they argue 
that absolute power does not attract – it 
repels (see e.g. Mearsheimer 1990: 11-21). 
Therefore, the present American 
administration’s policy of creating a formal 
American “empire” by upholding the present 
unipolar system, is what other people (and 
also states to an increasing extent) around 
the world find repulsive. As such, anti-
Americanism is also due to the 
unattractiveness of the present Bush 
administration. But we must also in our 
analysis take into consideration that a policy 
by the US which underscores its hard 
power, in the longer run, also risks losing its 
soft power resources. Hence, anti-
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Americanism could not only be regarded as 
resistance towards what the Americans are 
doing, but also resistance towards who they 
are. In such a perspective, the films and 
books by Michael Moore could be regarded 
as a warning sign to the US authorities 
about what will happen to the United States 
if the arrogant and unilateral course of the 
Bush Administration continues. 
 
Additional Explanations 
 
The Promise of Social Constructivism 
 
The social constructivist approach to IR is 
interested in the interplay of interests and 
ideas, as well as in the impact of norms, 
culture and institutions of international 
politics (Steans & Pettiford 2005: 181). 
According to Emanuel Adler, social 
constructivists share two understandings: 
what Stefano Guzzini summarized as the 
social construction of knowledge and the 
construction of social reality (Adler 2001: 
95). These are, according to Adler, social 
constructivism’s common ground, the view 
that the material world does not come 
classified, and that, therefore, the objects of 
our knowledge are not independent of our 
interpretations and our language (ibid.). 
Therefore, social constructivism sees the 
world as a project under construction, as 
becoming rather than being. According to 
Adler: “Unlike idealism and post-
structuralism and postmodernism, which 
take the world only as it can be imagined or 
talked about, constructivism accepts that 
not all statements have the same epistemic 
value and that there is consequently some 
foundation for knowledge” (ibid.).  
 As already pointed out in the 
previous chapter, social constructivism can 
also be applied as an approach to achieve a 
better understanding of Michael Moore’s 
book and films which treats the US after the 
terrorist attacks in 2001. Both Moore’s book 
and film raises some interesting arguments 
about how the representation of something 
as a threat to a particular community can be 
used to justify measures that would 
otherwise not be seen as legitimate. In Jill 
Steans and Lloyd Pettifords book 
“Introduction to International Relations – 
Perspectives & Themes” they apply a social 
constructivist approach to get a deeper 
understanding of “Fahrenheit 911”. Their 
point is that the US foreign policy is not 
guided by rational calculations of threats to 
the national interests, based on sound 
intelligence (as realists and neo-realists 
suggest it is, or at least should be), but 
instead the notion of a “threat” which is 
discursively constructed, first of all by the 
Bush administration (Steans & Pettiford 
2005: 199): “The Bush administration and 
the mass media created a state of fear in 
the USA that led people not only to be 
suspicious of strangers, but to take steps to 
protect themselves from possible attack – 
even in the local, neighbourhood Wal-Mart 
in middle America” (ibid.). Even more, as 
already underlined in the previous chapter, 
there was no credible intelligence to 
suggest that Saddam Hussein was 
supporting or harbouring al-Qaida terrorists, 
and those WMD’s have not, and most 
probably never will be, discovered.  
 Jill Steans and Lloyd Pettiford also 
underline that social constructivism is 
similar to post-structuralism, although a 
poststructuralist would be likely to see the 
“threat” to the US mainland as constructed 
in the service of justifying and legitimising 
intervention in Iraq: “However, in so far as it 
is suggested by Moore that this intervention 
was to safeguard the interests of the US oil 
industry, which in turn had close links to 
George W. Bush and other key members of 
the administration, you might feel that this 
film resonates more with neo-Gramscian 
notions of hegemony, ideology and 
transnational class interests” (ibid.).  
 Steans and Pettiford’s last point is 
important to take into consideration when 
one investigates Michael Moore’s book and 
film. Hence, there are several ways to 
approach our research object. Social 
constructivism can therefore be applied as a 
supplementary approach to our soft power 
understanding of how Michael Moore is 
communicating with his audience. The 
promise of social constructivism lies in the 
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fact that it is showing us how even threats 
can be discursively constructed. Social 
constructivism’s strength is that it gives us a 
better understanding of how the world is 
continuously reproduced in the interplay of 
structure and agency. Furthermore, for 
social constructivists, national interests is a 
category that needs to be explained, rather 
than being treated as an explanatory factor. 
Furthermore, social constructivists are 
interested in how interests and norms and 
institutions interact – for instance – in the 
“construction” of threats against the United 
States. Methodologically speaking, a social 
constructivist approach normally stresses 
historical processes, because it is otherwise 
unable to demonstrate the interplay of 
structure and agency. As suggested by 
Steans and Pettiford, also critical theories 
as well as Gramscian and neo-Gramscian 
approaches could have been applied. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Michael Moore is one of the most disputed 
authors and filmmakers in the United 
States. The purpose of this article has 
therefore been to try to shed some new 
insights on our understanding of Michael 
Moore’s political views as they are 
represented in his latest book (“Dude, 
Where’s My Country?”) and film 
(“Fahrenheit 911”). By applying the soft 
power concept, we have tried to illustrate 
how Moore is advocating a new foreign 
policy of the United States. This is a United 
States which safeguards an international 
system made up by norms, institutions and 
a collective international order. We have 
therefore tried to illustrate how these views 
correspond with a soft power-oriented USA.  
It has furthermore been an aim with 
this article to try to put Michael Moore into 
the current IR debate on such important 
themes as American multilateralism versus 
unilateralism, the influence of the neo-
conservatives and the state of the American 
“empire”. By doing that, we have tried to 
reach a deeper understanding of the 
intellectual tradition Michael Moore is 
standing in. Furthermore, by applying an 
“IR-way”, we have tried to explain why 
Michael Moore has become one of the most 
influential Americans at the start of the 21st 
century.  
 It is our view that Michael Moore’s 
influence on the international stage must be 
seen within the context of the tremendous 
changes which have taken place in the 
foreign policies of the United States in 
recent years. A United States which is at 
“war” against terrorism internationally as 
well as domestically, has changed the 
political life in the United States dramatically 
in recent years. By securitising terrorism, 
the US has applied measures which in more 
“normal times” would have been regarded 
as illegitimate. Michael Moore’s receipe is 
more soft power as a way to meet the 
challenges from terrorism. It is however also 
important to underline that Moore is not 
dismissing hard power as a measure in the 
fight against terrorism either. But, as 
emphasised by Moore, the fight against 
terrorism is not a war that can be won. 
Terrorism is crime and must be treated in 
such a way. 
Therefore, Michael Moore’s critique 
of the foreign policy orientation of the 
current Bush Administration has gained him 
much critique and repulsiveness, but also 
admiration as well as respect. This is, in our 
view, also a sign of American soft power. 
We could therefore state that the views 
Moore represents is the culture and values 
that other people around the world find 
attractive with the United States. What is 
more, Moore is aiming to tell us that he 
represents an “another America” as 
compared with the foreign- and defence 
policy elite in Washington DC. As we have 
tried to illustrate, popular culture and media, 
as well as a particular set of normative 
values, is regularly identified as a source of 
soft power. Therefore, Michael Moore’s 
views must not be regarded as part of the 
rising anti-Americanism in the world. On the 
contrary, Michael Moore could be regarded 
as an American patriot, but also an 
American patriot who applies left-wing 
populist rhetoric as a way to communicate 
with his audience.  
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The rise of anti-Americanism must therefore 
in part be understood as a consequence of 
the present unipolar international system as 
well as the foreign policy orientation which 
characterise the Bush Administration. 
Furthermore, it must also be emphasised 
that anti-Americanism has long “intellectual 
roots” in e.g. European history. In fact we 
can trace anti-Americanism back to the 
times when the American republic was 
created at the end of the 18th century. Anti-
Americanism is therefore not a new 
phenomenon. A soft power oriented United 
States, however, which pursues a 
multilateral and hence institution based 
foreign policy with emphasis on collective 
arrangements as e.g. the United Nations 
(UN), could therefore, in a longer 
perspective, reduce the unfortunate results 
that anti-Americanism poses.
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